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Centralization of strategic decisions during the Great Recession: 
An empirical analysis of European manufacturing firms 
Zoltán Bakonyi - Balázs Muraközy 
 
Abstract  
 
This study analyzes which types of firm-level shocks were associated with the centralization 
of strategic decision-making during the recession of 2008-09. We use a unique survey 
dataset of more than 14000 manufacturing firms from seven European countries which 
includes direct information on whether the firms centralized or decentralized their strategic 
decision-making process. Motivated by theoretical approaches claiming that organizations 
under considerable stress are more likely to centralize, we use multinomial logit models to 
test whether firms facing a larger fall in turnover, employment, investment or having to 
postpone their innovations were more likely to change their decision-making process. We 
find evidence that employment change and postponing innovations are indeed associated 
with centralization even when we control for ownership, group structure, financing, 
management, and strategy. 
 
JEL: M21, D22, D23 
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Stratégiai döntések központosítása a 2008-as válság alatt 
Európai feldolgozóipari vállalatok empirikus vizsgálata 
Bakonyi Zoltán - Muraközy Balázs  
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A tanulmány azt vizsgálja, hogy a vállalatokat érő sokkok közül melyek jártak együtt a 
stratégiai döntéshozatal centralizációjával a 2008-2009-es válság idején. Egy egyedülálló 
felmérés adatait használjuk, melyben hét európai ország több mint 14000 feldolgozóipari 
vállalatát kérdezték meg. Az adatbázis közvetlen információt tartalmaz arról, hogy a 
vállalatok centralizálták vagy decentralizálták a stratégiai döntéshozatali folyamataikat. Az 
elemzés hátterét azok az elméleti megközelítések jelentik, melyek szerint a jelentős nyomás 
alatt álló szervezetek nagyobb valószínűséggel központosítanak. Multinomiális logit 
modellekkel teszteljük, hogy azon vállalatok, amelyek bevételüknek, foglalkoztatottjaik 
számának vagy beruházásaiknak nagyobb visszaesését szenvedték el, vagy innováció 
elhalasztására kényszerültek, nagyobb valószínűséggel változtatták-e meg a döntéshozatali 
eljárásukat. Eredményeink arra utalnak, hogy a foglalkoztatottak számának változása és az 
innováció elhalasztása valóban összefügg a központosítással akkor is, ha kontrollálunk a 
tulajdonosi hátteret, a vállalatcsoportban elfoglalt pozíciót, a finanszírozást, a 
menedzsmentet és a stratégiát leíró változókra. 
 
JEL: M21, D22, D23 
 
Tárgyszavak: központosítás, Európa, válság 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms adjust to recessions on many levels. While altering the production process or looking 
for new sources of financing may not require radical changes, successful firms often make 
bold strategic decisions. Moreover, an efficient and timely reaction may also require 
restructuring the strategic decision-making process itself. Such organizational change may be 
crucial in weathering the recession, yet it can also have persistent effects on future strategy 
and growth. This paper focuses on such major changes, asking how many and which firms 
have centralized or decentralized their strategic decision-making process during the Great 
Recession of 2008-09.1 
In particular, our aim is to investigate which kinds of organizational shocks affect 
centralization decisions. We study four types of shocks. First, turnover may fall, reflecting a 
decline in demand for the products of the firm. Such a shock may be considered largely 
exogenous from the viewpoint of the firm and may trigger centralization to cut costs and 
manage resources more efficiently.  
The other three kinds of shocks represent decisions made by the management as a 
reaction to external shocks and future prospects. Hence the effect of these shocks may reflect 
both the expectations of managers and their preferences or strategy. The first such decision is 
whether to lay off employees, which we can proxy with the change in employment. This is a 
though decision and may reflect quite negative expectations but may also, in itself, generate 
additional stress and extra need for coordination in the organization. The second type of 
decision, cutting investments, constitutes a relatively easy way to meet short-term targets. 
While cutting investments may not generate much conflict, it may mean sacrificing the 
potential for future growth. Finally, managers may postpone innovations. The relationship 
between the latter decision and centralization is especially interesting because a negative 
relationship between centralization and innovation is often emphasized.  
Studying the advantages and disadvantages of centralized and decentralized decision-
making is one of the classic topics of both Economics2 and Business literatures.3 Another 
strand of literature has studied the different dimensions along which firms adjusted to 
recessions.4 However, as yet, however, there is no consensus about the relationship between 
                                                          
1 This has been the most serious financial crisis since the Great Depression (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009). In 2008 and 2009, the world economy had to face a 6.5 percent decline in industrial output 
and a 12.8 percent decrease in international commerce. In the European Union these numbers were 
even larger (13.7 percent and 15 percent depression) (Békés, Halpern and Muraközy, 2011).  
2 See see Hayek (1944), Lange (1957), Hage and Aiken (1967), Child (1972), Mintzberg (1990), Ansoff 
(1991), Golden (1992), Nohria and Goshal (1994), Davis et al. (2009).  
3 See Hage and Aiken (1967), Richardson et al. (2002), Argyres and Silverman (2004). 
4 Albeit companies can suffer from economic crises in the long run (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009), rapid 
reactions can be crucial for their survival (Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984; Smart and Vertinsky, 1984; 
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recessions and the direction of change in the centralization of strategic decision-making. 
While some researchers found that companies become more centralized during recessions or 
more intense competition (Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973; Richardson et al., 2002; Davis, 
Eisenhardt and Bingham 2009; Kunisch et al., 2012), other studies claimed that such an 
environment is conducive to decentralization (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Marin and Verdier, 
2008; Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek, 2008; Aghion and Bloom, 2014).  
This study provides empirical evidence to this debate based on a unique survey 
database including detailed information for 14,000 manufacturing companies from seven 
European countries. The database was constructed from the European Firms in the Global 
Economy (EFIGE) survey which directly asked firms whether they had centralized or 
decentralized their strategic decision-making process during 2009. Importantly, the database 
also contains information about the shocks during 2009 and provides details on many other 
firm characteristics. 
We formulate four hypotheses about the effect of different shocks on centralization. In 
particular, we hypothesize that firms are more likely to centralize their decision-making 
process if they (1) face a larger fall in turnover (2) experience a larger decline in the number 
of their employees (3) reduce their investments (4) postpone planned innovation projects. 
While we find descriptive evidence largely in line with all four hypotheses, a 
multinomial logit regression analysis provides evidence mainly for the second and fourth 
hypotheses: a 10 percentage point larger (more negative) employment shock was associated 
with a 1.4 percentage points larger probability of centralization, while postponing innovation 
increased the probability of centralization by nearly 6 percent. The decline in sales and 
investment is only weakly associated with centralization when we control for employment 
and innovation change.  
By using an instrumental variables strategy we show that these findings do not result 
from reverse causality. We also include a number of controls to these regressions to find that 
the main results do not change, but many other factors – including country effects, 
ownership, and strategy focus – were associated with the centralization of decisions during 
the Great Recession. 
Our paper provides several interesting conclusions and contributions to the literature. 
First, we offer evidence in favor of theories predicting increased centralization following large 
shocks. Our results are very much in line with theories emphasizing threat-rigidity as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Schuh, 2012). Because of the changes in the environment, companies have to find new sources of value 
creation by the reallocation of resources (Fruk, Hall and Mittal, 2013). However, most companies 
focus on short-term achievements and act reactively rather than in a proactive way (Kunc and 
Bhandari, 2011). See also Smart and Vertinsky (1984), Barker, Vincent and Duhaime (1997), Wilson 
and Eilertsen (2010), Fruk et al. (2013). 
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an efficient search for solutions in rapidly changing complex landscapes. The estimated 
effects show that organizational change involving re-defining strategic decision-making may 
be an important margin of adjustment during recessions. 
Second, many theoretical frameworks emphasize that more centralized decision-
making is less conducive to innovation. Centralization during large shocks may provide an 
explanation for reduced innovation during recessions. This point is borne out by our finding 
that postponing innovations is strongly related to centralization. Consequently, managers 
may have to focus on maintaining the innovative capabilities of their firms during periods of 
increased centralization.  
Third, we show evidence for the heterogeneity of this effect. Firms facing different 
kinds or degrees of shocks react differently. We also find evidence that suggests that reactions 
to a recession may differ greatly across countries and firms with different characteristics. 
Such heterogeneity suggests that firm-level experiences may significantly differ from industry 
averages, and as a result, understanding industry or macro dynamics may require studying 
these decisions at the firm level.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical 
background. Section 3 introduces our data and methodology, while Section 4 describes our 
results. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
We will define centralization as the concentration of decision-making authority in the 
organization. Centralization can be analyzed at the three basic levels of strategic 
management: (1) strategy making5; (2) implementation6; and (3) control7. While it is possible 
to analyze multiple levels simultaneously8, this paper will focus on the highest level, i.e. 
strategic decision-making. 
Theories about the effect of recessions on centralization can be classified into two broad 
groups. The first group assumes that the change in the decision-making process is an optimal 
choice: following a change in the environment, managers act optimally when reorganizing the 
firm. The second group builds on behavioral theories emphasizing the psychological factors 
which may become dominant under increased pressure during recessions. The distinction 
                                                          
5 Hage and Dewar (1973), Gates and Egelhoff (1986), Roth and O’Donell (1996), Richardson et al. 
(2002). 
6 Child (1972) Baum and Wally (2003), Lin and Germain (2003), Ling et al. (2008), Peng (2009). 
7 Pfeffer and Leblebici (1973), Eisenhardt (1985), Marin and Verdier (2008). 
8 E.g., Golden (1992), Colignon and Covaleski (1993), Puga and Trefler (2002), Baum and Wally 
(2003), Kunisch et al. (2012). 
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between these two approaches is relevant because if increased centralization during 
recessions is indeed suboptimal, then firms can enhance their performance by deliberately 
paying attention to the psychological factors underlying centralization and by regularly 
monitoring, and reviewing their decision-making processes. 
 
Approaches based on optimization 
 
When optimization is assumed (e.g., Hage and Aiken, 1967; Abbey and Dickson, 1983; Davis 
et al., 2009), the choice is often interpreted in the context of a tradeoff between the larger 
efficiency of centralized firms (Ansoff, 1991; Golden, 1993; Baum and Wally, 2003; Alonso et 
al., 2008) and the higher innovative performance of more decentralized companies (Meyer, 
1982; Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Davis et al., 2009; Zoghi, Mohr and Meyer, 2010).  
A key construct in this literature is the model of Aghion and Tirole (1997) (A-T) which 
claims that delegation is optimal when chief executive officers (CEOs) are overloaded with 
projects (e.g., during recessions). Based on this A-T model, Marin and Verdier (2008) find 
that CEOs are most likely to delegate authority if there is a medium level of competition.  
Other approaches emphasize the advantages of centralization. According to Staw, 
Sandelands and Dutton (1984) centralization strengthens the weak links in the organization. 
Davis et al. (2009) argue that it is preferable to err on the side of too much structure than on 
the side of too much decentralization. Dowell, Shakell and Stuart (2011) state that firms with 
a more centralized corporate governance structure can react to crises more effectively. 
Another approach analyzes optimal choices when problem solving involves search in 
complex landscapes. Nickerson and Zenger (2004) argue that the optimal organizational 
form is determined by the type of problems the company faces. Market mechanisms are 
better when problems are easily decomposable, while hierarchy is more efficient when the 
problem is non-decomposable and the solution landscape is complex. These authors 
distinguish between two types of hierarchy: (1) authority-based hierarchy and (2) consensus-
based hierarchy. Consensus-based hierarchy is useful if the problems are non-decomposable 
and the solution process needs high knowledge-interactions (e.g., new product development). 
Authority-based hierarchy can be optimal if the problems are nearly-decomposable, in other 
words, they can be solved by fewer interactions.  
This approach may predict that centralization is optimal during recessions because of 
two reasons. First, recessions create a new economic reality by definition. As a result, the 
initially simple solution landscape turns into a more complex one, including more nearly-
decomposable problems. Therefore, market-type organizations must become more 
centralized to gain efficiency. Second, timely actions may become more important during 
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crises, and operating consensus-based hierarchies can be rather time-consuming. As a result, 
centralized decision-making may perform better even if it leads to slightly sub-optimal 
solutions.  
 
Behavioral approaches 
 
One behavioral approach to the study of the problem is based on the theory about the “sense 
of urgency”. During crises, companies have to face a changing and hostile environment 
(Smart and Vertinsky, 1984). According to Kotter (1995), the sense of urgency is an 
important determinant of whether the organizational change will be successful. A sense of 
urgency means that most members of the organization are forced to examine market realities 
and opportunities, which stimulate change. Because of the dramatic change in the 
competitive environment during recessions (Fruk et al., 2013), the sense of urgency can be a 
strong motivator to restructure authority. As a greater shock may lead to an increased sense 
of urgency, this theory predicts that firms facing bigger shocks are more likely to change their 
decision-making structure. The sense of urgency approach, however, does not provide strong 
predictions about the direction of such a change.  
Another behavioral approach that helps to understand organizational reactions to 
recessions is based on threat-rigidity. An important characteristic of recessions is increased 
uncertainty (Haddow et al., 2013) which may be perceived as a threat by actors in 
organizations (Mone, McKinley and Barker, 1998). According to Carone and Di Iorio (2013), 
under stress, uncertainty, and fear, our decision-making habits differ from the cognitive 
schemes under normal circumstances. Threat-rigidity theorists suggest that recessions 
inhibit cognitive processes (Mone et al., 1998) and, hence, increase the demand for control 
and coordination in the firm.9 
This process may affect the behavior of both managers and employees. First, 
management can be motivated to centralize in order to feel more empowered to handle 
decline. According to Staw et al. (1984), under threat conditions there is a restriction in 
information processing and a constriction of control. The headquarters believe that they can 
overcome the challenge of a hostile environment by stronger control mechanisms. As Baum 
and Wally (2003) state, decentralized decision-making about operations improves 
performance, but centralized strategic decision-making can still be beneficial because it 
                                                          
9 In threat situations control constrictions also emit dominant and well-learnt responses in the 
organization (Staw et al., 1984; Baum and Wally, 2003). Fruk et al. (2013) also point out that during 
the crisis managers did not use significantly different resource reallocation mechanisms from the 
previous periods. 
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increases efficiency. As a consequence, during recessions, the management is motivated to 
gain more control by centralization.  
Second, the employees themselves can prefer centralization in an organization under 
stress. Higgins and Freedman (2013) identified 20 emotional factors which influence 
decision-making under recessions. One example is the “sunflower reflex” which means that 
organizational members believe that their leaders can help them to survive the crisis. Such 
factors may lead employees to demand more centralized strategic decision-making (Staw et 
al., 1984; Richardson et al., 2002).  
 
Empirical results 
 
Companies implement a wide range of strategies during recession (Barker et al., 1997), 
including both defensive (cost and investment reduction) and growth strategies (new 
products and marketing) (Wilson and Eilertsen, 2010). Barker et al. (1997) emphasize the 
importance of organizational restructuring, including the centralization of decision-making, 
during crisis management. Most of the studies agree, however, that cost reduction is the most 
prevalent reaction (Dobbs, Karakolev and Maliges, 2001).  
An important result comes from the longitudinal analysis of Aghion and Bloom (2014) 
who find that decentralized firms performed better during recessions, which confirms the 
main prediction of the Aghion and Tirole (1997) model. 
The contingency approach of centralization examines what kinds of contextual factors 
influence centralization of organizations. Such research, in contrast to Aghion and Bloom 
(2014), mostly found that firms are more likely to centralize during crises. Pfeffer and 
Leblebici (1973) point out that competition increases the need for centralization. Richardson 
et al. (2002) state that CEOs are more willing to delegate at the time of prosperity. Davis et 
al. (2009) uses a simulation model to show that when the environment is rapidly evolving 
erring on the side of centralization may be preferable. Based on a survey, Kunisch et al. 
(2012) found that during recessions, company headquarters increased their control over the 
subunits.  
Importantly, the centralization of decision-making also follows secular trends. 
According to Marin and Verdier (2008), during the first decade of 2000s there was a 
decentralization trend in Europe and in the United States while Schuh (2012) has shown that 
we have experienced a centralization trend since 2010.  
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Hypotheses 
 
The different approaches we have discussed yield different predictions about the relationship 
between the size of the shock faced by the firm and centralization. The Aghion-Tirole (1997) 
model suggests that decentralization is the optimal response during recessions, thus more 
serious shocks may lead to centralization. In contrast, the threat-rigidity approach suggests a 
positive association between the seriousness of the shocks and centralization, because of the 
increased psychological demand for centralization at times when people perceive increased 
threats. Similarly, when search in complex solution landscapes is considered, centralization 
may prove to be optimal in the rapidly changing landscape during crises. Finally, the sense of 
urgency approach suggests that shocks may trigger organizational changes but it does not 
provide strong predictions about the direction of change. Still, we will formulate our 
hypotheses based on the idea that greater shocks faced by an organization are more likely to 
lead to increased centralization. 
Our first hypothesis takes the fall in turnover as a proxy for the general and largely 
exogenous fall in the demand for the products of the firm. We assume that a larger fall in 
demand indicates a bigger general shock, and hence, is associated with centralization.  
H1. Firms facing a larger fall in turnover are more likely to centralize. 
Second, the decision by the firm to lay off workers is likely to reflect a large fall in 
demand and negative expectations. Laying off workers, can increase centralization directly in 
at least two ways. First, this process usually brings about extra organization stress, which 
may generate a stronger demand for centralization. Second, the change in the organization 
itself can create additional coordination problems which may be handled by further 
centralization. 
Our aim is to test for this additional effect of laying off workers by including the change 
in employment together with the fall in demand in our empirical specification. We 
hypothesize that layoffs increase the degree of centralization even in the case of firms where 
the fall in demand may be similar. 
H2. Firms facing a larger reduction in their workforce are more likely to centralize even 
when we control for the fall in turnover. 
Third, cutting investments can be a relatively easy strategy to handle problems in the 
short run. Such a decision may reflect the seriousness of the shock as perceived by managers 
and also the time horizon of these decision-makers. We will test whether this organizational 
shock is related to centralization with the following hypothesis: considerably 
H3. Firms reducing their investment substantially are more likely to centralize their 
decision-making. 
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Another margin of adjustment is the postponement of innovations. This decision may 
once again reflect the expectations of managers. But, as we have discussed, many theories 
emphasize the negative relationship between innovation and centralization. Hence, 
postponing innovations can also reflect the time horizon of decisions as well as the managers’ 
attitude to potentially innovative, decentralized mechanisms within the firm. Again, we are 
interested in the additional effect of this variable when controlling for the other 
organizational shock variables: 
H4. Firms postponing innovation projects are more likely to centralize their decision-
making even when controlling for demand and other shocks. 
An alternative interpretation is that the different variables reflect “layers” of reaction to 
shocks either in terms of timing or severity. First, demand shock (proxied by the fall in 
turnover) is the most exogenous and hits first in time. After such a shock, the easiest way to 
cut costs is to “postpone” innovations or cut investments. These decisions are unlikely to 
generate much extra stress or a sense of urgency in the organization. If this is not sufficient, 
managers may be forced to implement layoffs which lead to increased organizational stress as 
well as financial and emotional costs, generating a sense of urgency and threat. In this 
respect, one may expect that employment change is a stronger predictor of centralization 
than the other variables. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
In this paper we use a unique firm-level survey conducted as part of the EFIGE project. It 
focuses on the economic activities of European manufacturing firms in several areas such as 
structure, employment, export, investments, competition and finance. The survey was carried 
out at the beginning of 2010. The original dataset contains information about 14,759 firms 
(Altomonte and Aquilante, 2012, p. 6.), but we excluded those that did not provide 
information about change in authority or change in turnover. Therefore, the final dataset 
contains answers from the top managers of 14,199 companies, which constitutes a 
representative sample of industrial (10+ employees) firms from seven countries: Austria 
(389), France (2,872), Germany (2,837), Hungary (441), Italy (2,922), Spain (2,764) and the 
United Kingdom (1,974). The number of observations across countries and industries is 
shown in Table 1.10 
 
                                                          
10 Not many large sample studies were published to study centralization recently (Zoghi et al., 2010; 
Aghion and Bloom, 2014; Hong, Kueng and Yang, 2015). Our analysis of this unique dataset can be an 
important addition to this literature. 
 Table 1 
Industries by country 
         
Industry / country Austria France Germany Hungary Italy Spain UK Total 
Manufacture of food products 32 191 257 46 190 376 95 1187 
Manufacture of beverages 1 17 45 8 36 49 9 165 
Manufacture of textiles 6 105 68 5 140 46 36 406 
Manufacture of wearing apparel 7 64 19 16 154 49 26 335 
Manufacture of leather and related products 1 31 11 2 93 47 8 193 
Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork 23 86 96 13 84 172 55 529 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 5 79 57 15 66 28 39 289 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 21 139 139 16 78 64 110 567 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 5 75 60 13 81 98 65 397 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and preparations - 21 15 2 20 16 4 78 
Manufacture of rubber products  17 227 200 33 153 136 113 879 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 15 144 86 25 159 156 34 619 
Manufacture of basic metals 10 63 55 6 75 60 31 300 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 69 828 551 93 583 519 289 2932 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 19 178 165 12 102 45 91 612 
Manufacture of electrical equipment  13 108 102 18 144 58 97 540 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 35 251 372 40 342 277 108 1425 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  5 84 41 10 44 61 23 268 
Manufacture of other transport equipment  3 20 17 2 34 29 15 120 
Manufacture of furniture 20 48 62 12 134 212 61 549 
Other manufacturing 5 36 145 5 69 52 146 458 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment  2 26 28 14 14 25 7 116 
14 
 
Other 75 51 248 35 127 189 512 1237 
Total 389 2,872 2,839 441 2,922 2,764 1,974 1,4201 
Note: "Other" contains observations where the firm conducts non-manufacturing activity as well  
(e.g. service activity) or the NACE 2-digit category  the firm belongs to contains less than 50 observations.  
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Measuring centralization and shocks 
 
Our dependent variable, the measure of change in centralization, is based on the following 
question: “During 2009, has strategic decision making become…,” to which managers could 
answer "more centralized," "more decentralized" or “nothing changed.” In the survey, 
centralization was defined as “the CEO/owner takes most decisions in every area” while 
decentralization as “managers can take autonomous decisions in some business areas”. 
According to this variable, 73.45 percent of firms did not change the concentration of 
authority, while 7.1 percent decentralized and 19.45 percent centralized during 2009.  
This approach is quite simple and straightforward compared to measures used by other 
authors11. We, however, see two main advantages of this method of measurement. First, as 
our question concerns a change, one can be relatively confident that managers can correctly 
identify the general direction of change rather than the magnitude or the level of 
centralization. Second, our general definition can incorporate changes both in formal and 
informal authority (Cohen and Lachman, 1988, Nohria and Goshal, 1994; Aghion and Tirol, 
1997; Adams, Almeida and Ferreira 2005).  
We will use four variables to test the hypotheses.  
First, we will measure the change in turnover based on the following question: “Did you 
experience a reduction of your turnover during 2009 in comparison with 2008?” Managers 
could choose from four answers: “No,” companies did not experience a reduction in turnover, 
"Yes, a reduction up to 10 percent," "Yes, a reduction between 10–30 percent” or "Yes, a 
reduction of more than 30 percent." The responses revealed that 28.5 percent of the 
companies did not experience a fall in turnover, 19 percent faced only moderate (0–10 %), 
34.5 percent a medium (10–30%), and 18 percent a serious one. In order to ease 
interpretation, we generate one “continuous” variable from these categories. We do this by 
replacing the intervals reported in the survey (e.g., between 10 and 30 %) with an expected 
turnover within the interval.12 Note that the continuous variable shows the change in 
                                                          
11 Previous studies used more sophisticated scales with e.g., three (Gates and Egelhoff, 1986; Kunisch 
et al., 2012); five (Nohria and Goshal, 1994; Roth and O’Donell, 1996; Argyres and Silverman, 2004); 
or seven categories (Richardson et al., 2002; Lin and Germain, 2003; Ling et al., 2008), while others 
use measures that rely less on the subjective judgment of the manager (e.g., Golden, 1992; Ling et al., 
2008). 
12 Another option would be to use the middle of the interval, but this approach is problematic when 
the interval is unbounded (e.g., „more than 30 %”). To handle these unbounded intervals, we fit a 
normal distribution (by running an interval regression, “intreg” in Stata) with only a constant, and 
then predicting the conditional expected value for each interval. This approach yields quite reasonable 
numbers: +12.6 percent for firms reporting that their turnover did not fall, -5.1 percent for firms which 
reported that their turnover fell between 0 and 10 percent, -19.3 percent for firms reporting a fall 
between 10 and 30 percent, and -41 percent for firms reporting a fall of larger than 30 percent. The 
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turnover rather than the decline in turnover, hence the more positive values are associated 
with a smaller negative (or more positive) shock. We will follow this logic for all our crisis 
variables. In Table A.1 in the Appendix we show that our results are robust to including the 
original set of dummies instead of the continuous measure into our regressions.  
We measure the change in employment based on the following question: “During the 
last year did you experience a reduction or an increase of your workforce in comparison with 
2008? (1) yes, a reduction of …   %  (2) yes, an increase of … %  (3) No, we did not 
experienced any change”. The answers to this question are continuous, and we code the 
variable again in a way that larger values show an increase in employment. Change in 
investment comes from a similar question: “During 2009 has your firm reduced its planned 
investments in machinery, equipment or ICT?”13 Finally, we generate a dummy which takes 
the value of 1 when a firm did not postpone any of its innovation projects according to its 
answer to the following question: “During 2009, has your firm decided to postpone 
investments in product or process innovation? (1) Yes (2) No.” 
The first three of these variables are coded in a way that they show percentage changes, 
i.e., +50 shows that the variable increased by 50 percent while -30 shows that the variable 
decreased by 30 percent. As lower values of these variables indicate a larger (more negative) 
shock, our hypotheses predict a negative sign for all of them in the centralization equation. 
Table A.2 in the Appendix shows the correlation table of these variables. The relatively 
low correlation among them suggests that these variables may indeed measure different 
dimensions of organizational shocks, so it is probably worthwhile to study all of them, even in 
one regression. 
 
Control variables 
 
According to Wilson and Eilertsen (2010), smaller firms experienced a more serious shock 
during the crisis than larger ones. Obviously small firms may change their decision-making 
processes more easily than larger ones, so it is important to control for firm size. We do so by 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
results are robust to modifications of this procedure, such as using the middle of the intervals and +10 
and -40 for the two unbounded intervals. 
13 Here there were two answer possibilities: „ 1) Yes, a reduction of … % (2) No.” As a result, we only 
know the exact value of change for firms with lower investment. To approximate the change in 
investment for firms that did not cut their investments, we replace the variable with the conditional 
expected value (14 % increase) estimated with a tobit (with only a constant) for firms answering “no” 
for the question. In Table A.1 in the Appendix we show that our results are robust to including a 
dummy for firms answering that they did not reduce their investments and another one for firms 
reporting that they reduced their investment by 100 percent (where another potential truncation can 
be present).  
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including the following employment dummies in our regressions: 10-19 people (32 % of firms 
in the sample), 20-49 (41 %), 50-249 (20 %) and 250 or more (7 %). 
We also include two-digit NACE industry dummies to control for the heterogeneous 
shocks in different industries (Békés et al., 2011) as well as the possibly heterogeneous 
organization of firms in different sectors.14 Country dummies are also added to control for 
such factors as differences in management culture (Geletkanycz, 1997), pre-crisis 
organization (Aghion and Bloom, 2014) and the degree of recession (Békés et al., 2011; Shuh, 
2012).  
 
Estimation strategy 
 
As our dependent variable is categorical and can take three values, one has to use a discrete 
choice model. In particular, we have chosen a multinomial logit model because it is relatively 
flexible and easy to interpret. 
In the multinomial logit framework the probability that outcome 𝑘 will be chosen by 
firm 𝑖 is: 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑘) =
𝑒𝑥𝑖
′𝛽𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑖
′𝛽𝑘𝐾−1
𝑘=1
  for all k. 
Here, 𝑥𝑖 is the vector of explanatory variables while 𝛽𝑖 is the parameter vector to be 
estimated. We always choose “no change” as the base category while “centralized” and 
“decentralized” are the two alternatives. Besides the parameters, we also estimate average 
marginal effects for easier interpretation.15 
One potential identification problem is the possibility of reverse causality, because the 
decision about centralization may affect our shock variables. To check the relevance of this 
issue, we instrument these variables with the average fall of revenue at the four-digit 
industry-country level in a two-stage least squares regression (i.e., a proxy for the seriousness 
of the crisis at a more disaggregated level than our industry and country dummies). This 
industry-country level fall in turnover should be exogenous from the perspective of the firm 
because it is unlikely to be affected by the individual firm’s centralization decision. We chose 
the industry-level fall in demand variable as an instrument for all of our shock variables 
because it if the very likely the most exogenous variable as well as a good proxy for external 
                                                          
14 We created an “other” category for 2-digit industries with less than 50 observations and 
manufacturing firms which reported a non-manufacturing industry code. Our results are robust to 
dropping these firms from the sample.  
15 We use the “margins” command of Stata to do so.  
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demand conditions firms , and may, to some extent, determine to some extent the other 
variables.  
Running this model requires addressing two issues. First, an instrumental variable 
strategy may be very complicated to use in a multinomial logit setting, therefore, we simply 
run a linear regression with a dummy representing whether the firm centralized or not.16 
Second, in some industry-country combinations we observe very few firms and, hence, the 
given firm can play a very large role in the average, which may threaten the exclusion 
restriction. To handle this, we always exclude the firm in question from the calculation of the 
industry-country level average. We also drop the observation when only one firm is present in 
an industry-country cell. 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive evidence 
 
Table 2 shows how firms facing different shocks changed their level of centralization.17 
During 2009 7.1 percent of firms decentralized and 19.45 percent of firms centralized their 
strategic decision-making. The probability of centralization is strongly related to all our shock 
measures. In terms of change in turnover, only about 15 percent of firms with an increasing 
turnover centralized compared to 23 percent of firms which faced a very serious fall, with the 
other two categories in between. The differences in this respect are even more pronounced 
for the change in employment: 16 percent of firms with increasing employment centralized, 
while this share was 31 percent for firms deciding on a large layoff. A similar pattern is found 
for investment (17.4 vs 23.1 %). Finally, 25 percent of firms postponing innovations 
centralized compared to 16.3 percent of other firms. In contrast to centralization, the 
relationship between these variables and decentralization is quite weak. The strongest 
pattern can be seen for the postponing innovation variable with 8.6 percent of postponing 
firms decentralizing compared to 6.3 percent of non-postponing firms.  
                                                          
16 This is in line with the multinomial logit results which show that our variables are more likely to 
affect centralization than decentralization. Excluding decentralizing firms from this regression yields 
similar results.  
17 As it was discussed, the change in employment and investment variables are continuous, but we 
divide them into these intervals to ease the interpretation of the descriptive statistics. 
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Regression results 
 
While the descriptive results of the previous subsection are suggestive, regression analysis is 
needed to show if the patterns arise because of a composition effect and whether the different 
shocks have independent effects.  
Table 3 shows the results from a multinomial regression.18 The first two columns show 
the coefficients when the change in turnover and labor are included as explanatory variables, 
while columns (3) and (4) show the average marginal effects of the same variables for the 
                                                          
18 Industry dummies are not reported for brevity. 
Table 2 
Different shocks and the centralization decision 
 
Decentralized 
No change  
in centralization Centralized Total 
No change or increase in sales 7.43 77.63 14.94 28.34 
Sales decrease: 0-10% 7.79 73.76 18.45 19.16 
Sales decrease: 10-30% 6.61 71.43 21.96 34.41 
Sales decrease: >30% 6.78 70.40 22.82 18.18 
     No change or increase in 
employment 6.98 76.92 16.1 53.96 
Employment decrease: 0-10% 7.3 72.24 20.46 22.27 
Employment decrease: 10-30% 6.87 68.42 24.7 18.44 
Employment decrease: >30% 8.2 60.85 30.95 5.32 
     No change or increase in 
investment 6.65 75.98 17.37 62.80 
Investment decrease: 0-10% 6.9 73.53 19.57 5.61 
Investment decrease: 10-30% 9.28 65.59 25.13 6.98 
Investment decrease: >30% 7.67 69.21 23.12 24.61 
     Did not postpone innovation 
investment 6.26 77.49 16.26 64.02 
Postponed innovation 
investment 8.59 66.28 25.13 35.98 
Total 7.1 73.45 19.45   
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probability of decentralizing and centralizing, respectively. Columns (5)-(8) repeat this 
exercise with adding the change in investment and the “did not postpone innovation” 
dummies. When interpreting the magnitudes of the estimates, we rely on the estimated 
marginal effects.  
Let us consider the effect of the change in turnover and employment variables first. 
According to column (4), a 10 percentage point larger turnover shock (-10 change in the 
turnover change variable) is associated with a 0.57 percentage point (s.e.=0.2 percentage 
point, t-value=2.793) higher probability of centralization, while the effect of a similar sized 
employment shock is about three times as large with a 1.6 percentage point (s.e.=0.23 
percentage point, t-value=7.026) increase in this probability. These two variables are 
important both in economic (compared to the 19.45 % of centralizing firms) and statistical 
terms, in line with H1 and H2.  
The larger economic and statistical magnitude of employment change suggests that, in 
line with our hypothesis, employment change indeed has a strong, independent relationship 
with centralization, either because it reflects negative expectations or the added stress and 
coordination problems associated with layoffs. Interestingly, and in line with these 
considerations, the coefficient of this variable is positive in the decentralization equation, 
suggesting that firms facing a large employment shock are not only more likely to centralize, 
but are also less likely to decentralize.  
In columns (5)-(8) we add the investment and innovation variables to our regression. 
Again, column (8) shows the marginal effects of the variables for decentralization. The 
marginal effect of the investment variable has the expected sign, but is of a small magnitude. 
Hence, these results do not provide evidence for our hypothesis 3: when controlling for the 
other dimensions of the shock, we do not find an independent effect of investment change. 
In contrast, postponing innovation is strongly related to centralization: firms which had 
to postpone an innovation project were 5.75 percentage points (s.e.= 0.74 pp, t-value=7.739) 
more likely to centralize than similar firms which did not have to postpone such a project. 
This result is large both in economic and statistical terms, and is in line with the descriptive 
results. This finding provides support for theories emphasizing the strong relationship 
between decentralized organizations and innovation. Interestingly, this variable has a 
negative coefficient in the decentralizing equation (-1.8 pp, s.e.=0.5 pp, t-value=3.574) as 
well, suggesting that firms that postpone an innovation are more likely to change (either 
centralize or decentralize) their decision-making process. This may be explained within the 
sense of urgency framework by assuming that postponing innovation reflects a large shock 
which can generate a sense of urgency. 
 
  
Table 3  
Multinomial logit model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Decentralized Centralized Decentralized Centralized Decentralized Centralized Decentralized Centralized 
 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
                 
Sales change 0.00356 -0.00348 0.000281 -0.000567 0.00543 -0.00129 0.000370 -0.000270 
 
(0.00212) (0.00139) (0.000136) (0.000203) (0.00218) (0.00142) (0.000139) (0.000207) 
Employment 
change 
0.00165 
(0.00254) 
-0.0108 
(0.00159) 
0.000265 
(0.000162) 
-0.00163 
(0.000232) 
0.00292 
(0.00257) 
-0.00926 
(0.00161) 
0.000326 
(0.00161) 
-0.00140 
(0.000234) 
Investment 
change 
    
-0.000533 
(0.000577) 
-0.000797 
(0.000376) 
-2.26e-05 
(3.68e-05) 
-0.000109 
(5.46e-05) 
Postpone 
innovation 
inv. 
    
-0.364 
(0.0736) 
-0.417 
(0.0485) 
-0.0178 
(0.00498) 
-0.0575 
(0.00743) 
Employment: 
20-49 
0.336 
(0.0845) 
0.146 
(0.0535) 
0.0175 
(0.00468) 
0.0164 
(0.00732) 
0.333 
(0.0846) 
0.139 
(0.0538) 
0.0173 
(0.00468) 
0.0152 
(0.00731) 
Employment: 
50-249 
0.736 
(0.0967) 
0.451 
(0.0647) 
0.0418 
(0.00660) 
0.0564 
(0.00972) 
0.734 
(0.0968) 
0.448 
(0.0649) 
0.0415 
(0.00660) 
0.0554 
(0.00969) 
Employment:  
> 250 
0.705 
(0.140) 
0.760 
(0.0896) 
0.0321 
(0.00982) 
0.112 
(0.0157) 
0.715 
(0.141) 
0.764 
(0.0901) 
0.0325 
(0.00986) 
0.111 
(0.0156) 
France -0.691 -0.614 -0.0365 -0.0651 -0.691 -0.613 -0.0365 -0.0650 
 
(0.203) (0.152) (0.0147) (0.0201) (0.204) (0.152) (0.0148) (0.0201) 
Germany -0.306 -0.383 -0.0171 -0.0442 -0.302 -0.375 -0.0168 -0.0434 
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(0.197) (0.149) (0.0148) (0.0202) (0.197) (0.150) (0.0149) (0.0202) 
Hungary -0.575 0.262 -0.0380 0.0478 -0.570 0.273 -0.0382 0.0497 
 
(0.291) (0.180) (0.0174) (0.0272) (0.291) (0.181) (0.0175) (0.0273) 
Italy -0.414 0.748 -0.0369 0.138 -0.414 0.752 -0.0374 0.138 
 
(0.204) (0.145) (0.0147) (0.0212) (0.205) (0.146) (0.0148) (0.0212) 
Spain 0.668 0.629 0.0492 0.0877 0.615 0.569 0.0450 0.0776 
 
(0.194) (0.146) (0.0158) (0.0211) (0.194) (0.147) (0.0158) (0.0211) 
UK -0.488 -0.183 -0.0294 -0.0188 -0.487 -0.178 -0.0295 -0.0181 
 
(0.208) (0.152) (0.0150) (0.0208) (0.208) (0.152) (0.0151) (0.0208) 
Industry 
dummies 2-digit NACE 
2-digit 
NACE 2-digit NACE 
2-digit 
NACE 2-digit NACE 
2-digit 
NACE 2-digit NACE 
2-digit 
NACE 
Observations 14,201 14,201 14,201 14,201 14,201 14,201 14,201 14,201 
Pseudo R-2 0.0511 0.0511 0.0511 0.0511 0.0566 0.0566 0.0566 0.0566 
Log-
likelihood 
-9875 -9875 -9875 -9875 -9818 -9818 -9818 -9818 
Note: The table shows the results of the multinomial logit models estimating the impact on centralization decision. The 
dependent variable shows whether the firm centralized, decentralized or did not change their decision-making process during 
2009, with 'no change' as the base category. Columns 1 and 2 display regression coefficients, column 3 and 4 show marginal 
effects, while columns (4)-(8) repeat this exercise with a model where we also include the change in investment and a dummy 
showing if the firm postponed its innovation activities. Sales change is the modified continuous measure of decrease in turnover. 
Employment change is measured in percentage. Investment change is the modified continuous measure of change in investment. 
Postpone innovation investment is 1 when the firm did not postpone innovation investment and zero otherwise. Employment is 
measured with a set of dummies. In the case of countries the baseline is Austria. 2-digit industry NACE codes are included when 
noted. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
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When including these variables, the point estimate of the coefficient of turnover 
changes. In the centralization equation it halves and also becomes less significant while the 
estimate of employment change remains similar to our previous findings. This suggests that, 
after all, change in employment and postponing innovations are the strongest predictors of 
organizational change while the other shock measures have relatively small effects when we 
control for all these measures. 
Turning to our controls, we find some evidence that larger firms are more likely to 
change their level of centralization, as the coefficients of size dummies are positive both in 
the decentralization and centralization equations. The results are clearer in the case of 
centralization when the coefficients are gradually increasing with firm size. For example, 
according to the marginal effect estimates, medium-sized firms are 5.7, while large firms are 
11 percentage points more likely to centralize than smaller firms with 10–20 employees. 
Again, these effects are large both in economic and statistical terms. This finding suggests 
that managers of large firms are more likely to change, and especially to centralize the 
strategic decision-making process of the firm. 
When considering country effects, note that Austria is the base category. In terms of 
centralizing, we find evidence for large differences across countries. Firms were most likely to 
centralize in Italy and Spain, and least likely to do so in France and Germany. The difference 
between Italy and France is about 20 percentage points, which is again large enough both in 
economic and statistical terms. This effect provides evidence for the importance of country-
level cultural and institutional differences when deciding to take centralization decisions.  
As we have discussed already, one possible concern with this identification strategy is 
the possibility of reverse causality, i.e., that the centralization decision can affect our shock 
measures. As discussed above, we address this problem by including the four-digit industry-
country level average decline in turnover as an instrument for each of the firm-level shock 
measures. Because we have only one instrument, we will include the shock variables one by 
one into separate linear probability regressions when the dependent variable is a dummy 
showing whether the firm centralized or not.  
Results are presented in Table 4. The four blocks of the table show regressions when 
the different shock measures are included. In all blocks, column (1) shows an OLS for 
comparison, column (2) show 2SLS estimate when only the variable in question is included, 
column (3) shows results when size and country controls are included, while in column (4) 
we also add two-digit industry dummies.  
The similarity of the magnitude of the estimates in this table to the marginal effects 
estimated in the multinomial logit models suggests that our earlier results were not a 
consequence of reverse causality and it was indeed the shock variables that drove 
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centralization. In actual fact, the results reinforce that the employment change and the 
postponed innovation variables are the strongest predictors of centralization. Similarly to the 
earlier results, these variables are important both in economic and statistical terms: a 10 
percentage points larger employment shock is associated with a 3–8 percentage point larger 
probability of centralization, while postponing innovations may lead to 2.5–5 percent larger 
probability of centralization (depending on the set of controls included), while the other 
variables have smaller coefficients. 
Table 4 
Instrumental variable strategy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
OLS no controls no industry controls all controls 
         
Sales change  -0.00108 -0.00396 -0.00131 -0.00284 
 
(0.000188) (0.000523) (0.000592) (0.00144) 
     Observations 13,727 13,727 13,727 13,727 
R-squared 0.049   0.047 0.043 
     Employment change -0.00196 -0.00827 -0.00298 -0.00628 
 
(0.000224) (0.00111) (0.00134) (0.00321) 
     Observations 13,727 13,727 13,727 13,727 
R-squared 0.052   0.049 0.027 
     Investment change -0.000351 -0.00229 -0.000852 -0.00173 
 
(5.18e-05) (0.000316) (0.000385) (0.000894) 
     Observations 13,727 13,727 13,727 13,727 
R-squared 0.050   0.042 0.001 
     Postpone innovation inv. -0.0699 -0.484 -0.240 -0.444 
 
(0.00695) (0.0704) (0.110) (0.246) 
     Observations 13,727 13,727 13,727 13,727 
R-squared 0.054   0.011   
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Note: The table shows the results of the instrumental variable strategy estimating the impact 
on centralization decision. The dependent variable shows whether the firm centralized, 
decentralized or did not change their decision-making process during 2009, with 'no change' 
as the base category. Column 1 shows the result of the OLS estimation with employment, 
country and industry controls. Column 2-4 show the result of the IV strategy using various 
control variables. In column 2 no control variables are included, column 3 controls for 
employment and country, while in column 4 employment, country and industry controls are 
included. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
 
Robustness 
 
We conduct three types of robustness tests. First, we include a number of additional controls 
to handle omitted variable bias. Second, we estimate our model with a multinomial probit to 
see whether the results are robust to the more flexible probit function. Third, we include a 
more flexible functional form for the turnover and investment change variables which were 
not continuous in the raw data.  
One possible concern with our results is that both the crisis measures and 
centralization can be correlated with many omitted variables. In this subsection we exploit 
additional variables from the EFIGE dataset in order to introduce a number of controls to our 
main equation to see whether the main results change. First, in Table 5 we include variables 
measuring the ownership structure, financing, and group structure of the firm while in Table 
6 we include variables which proxy management and strategy. The main results turn out to 
be robust to the inclusion of these controls.  
Ownership. Agency theory pays a lot of attention to incomplete contracts between 
shareholders and management (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Grossman and Helpman 2004). 
The inefficiencies generated by these contracts can vary according to the type of the 
shareholder. Therefore, three control variables are added to the original model: shareholder 
type, foreign shareholder, and family owned firm.  
The variable showing the type of the most important shareholder can take the following 
values: 1 “Individual/Group of individuals”; 2 “Industrial firm”; 3 “Holding firm”; 4 “Bank or 
insurance company”; 5 “Other independent financial corporation not included in the group 
(private equity and venture capital)”; 6 “Public entity”; 7 “Other”. We create dummies for all 
these possible values of the variable with “Individual/Group of individuals” as the base 
category. The foreign shareholder and family owned firm variables are dummies. 
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Table 5 
Multinomial logit – robustness check 1 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Decentralized Centralized Decentralized Centralized 
 
Coefficients Marginal effects 
Sales change 0.00566 -0.000593 0.000374 -0.000168 
 (0.00227) (0.00149) (0.000145) (0.000213) 
Employment change 0.00230 -0.00949 0.000288 -0.0014 
 (0.00269) (0.00169) (0.000171) (0.000240) 
Investment change -0.000353 -0.000863 -1.02e-05 -0.00012 
 (0.000604) (0.000397) (3.85e-05) (5.66e-05) 
Postpone innovation inv. -0.333 -0.399 -0.0157 -0.0528 
 (0.0768) (0.0511) (0.00488) (0.00725) 
Shareholder: industrial 
firm -0.200 0.0405 -0.0127 0.00871 
 (0.151) (0.0933) (0.00847) (0.0136) 
Shareholder: holding 
firm -0.132 -0.152 -0.00631 -0.0192 
 (0.142) (0.0932) (0.00863) (0.0124) 
Shareholder: 
bank/insurance company 
0.322 
(0.550) 
0.229 
(0.391) 
0.0196 
(0.0440) 
0.0290 
(0.0610) 
Shareholder: other 
financial 0.147 0.768 -0.00485 0.13 
 (0.387) (0.223) (0.0236) (0.0431) 
Shareholder: public 
entity -1.186 -0.424 -0.0471 -0.0452 
 (1.024) (0.496) (0.0257) (0.0579) 
Shareholder: other 0.112 0.283 0.00280 0.042 
 (0.211) (0.133) (0.0142) (0.0215) 
Foreign shareholder -0.0199 0.218 -0.00446 0.0317 
 (0.208) (0.129) (0.0133) (0.0185) 
Family owned 0.187 0.113 0.0104 0.0136 
 (0.0874) (0.0566) (0.00559) (0.00809) 
Domestic affiliates 0.102 0.0536 0.00582 0.00632 
 (0.111) (0.0778) (0.00730) (0.0113) 
Foreign affiliates 0.286 -0.00211 0.0202 -0.00482 
 (0.129) (0.0939) -0.00982 (0.0131) 
Belong to national group 0.0383 0.403 -0.00383 0.0613 
 (0.122) (0.0786) (0.00753) (0.0127) 
Belong to foreign group 0.0912 0.385 -0.000162 0.0574 
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 (0.227) (0.142) (0.0146) (0.0231) 
External finance 0.171 -0.00712 0.0111 -0.00352 
 (0.0794) (0.0520) (0.00508) (0.00742) 
Self-financing (%) -0.000267 -0.000500 -9.95e-06 -6.83e-05 
 (0.000894) (0.000581) (5.71e-05) (8.30e-05) 
Industry dummies 2-digit NACE 
2-digit 
NACE 
2-digit NACE 2-digit NACE 
Observations 13,187 13,187 13,187 13,187 
Pseudo R-2 0.0623 0.0623 0.0623 0.0623 
Log-likelihood -9019 -9019 -9019 -9019 
Note: The table shows the results of the multinomial logit models estimating the impact 
on centralization decision. The dependent variable shows whether the firm centralized, 
decentralized or did not change their decision-making process during 2009, with 'no 
change' as the base category. Column 1 and 2 display regression coefficients, column 3 
and 4 show marginal effects. Sales change is the modified continuous measure of decrease 
in turnover. Employment change is measured in percentage. Investment change is the 
modified continuous measure of change in investment. Postpone innovation investment 
is 1 when the firm did not postpone innovation investment and zero otherwise. The other 
explanatory variables are dummy variables and described in the text. Initial 
centralization, employment and country controls are included, but not reported. 2-digit 
NACE codes are included as industry controls if noted. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
In Table 5 we do not find evidence for differences between the most frequent ownership 
structures, but there is some evidence that firms owned by “other” owners behave somewhat 
differently from family owned firms, which is the base category here. Second, we also find 
some evidence for more decentralization in family-owned firms: these firms are about 2 
percentage points more likely to decentralize than other firms.  
Finance. Leverage is an important issue in decentralization (Aghion, Room and Van 
Reenen, 2013). To track this effect, we include two variables, namely, whether the firm relies 
on external finance or is self-financing. External finance is a dummy which takes the value of 
1 if the company had recurrent external financing in the period 2008–2009. Self-financing is 
a continuous variable measuring which percentage of investments was financed from internal 
sources between 2007 and 2009. In Table 5 we do not find evidence for a relationship 
between financing and centralization: the marginal effects are small both in economic and 
statistical terms. 
Group organization. The SBU approach of centralization describes how headquarters 
and strategic business units interact (Golden, 1992; Kunisch et al., 2012). If a company is 
part of a group, it may simply follow group policies when designing its decision-making 
processes. Similarly, decisions about centralization may differ between local and 
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multinational firms. Therefore, we add two sets of dummies showing whether the firm is a 
member of a business group (separate dummies for national and foreign groups) and if it has 
affiliates (separate dummies for domestic and foreign affiliates).  
According to our estimates, firms which are part of a group were more likely to 
centralize than independent firms, irrespective of the nationality of the group. Indeed, group 
members were 6 percentage points more likely to centralize than independent firms. Having 
affiliates, on the other hand, does not seem to affect the probability of centralization.  
Most importantly, however, the point estimates and standard errors of the main 
variables remain very similar to the main table. In other words, the previous results are 
robust for controlling for ownership, finance, and group structure. 
Next we turn to the variables measuring the management and strategic characteristics 
of firms in Table 6. 
Management. Management capabilities can influence centralization, e.g., CEOs can be 
motivated in maintaining the status quo (Geletkanycz, 1997) or act differently if their goals 
are not aligned with those of the owners (Hong et al., 2015). We proxy these factors by three 
variables: CEO is also an owner, the age of the CEO, and whether the CEO receives 
performance based financial reward.  
We include 3 dummies to describe the recruitment of the managers. The base category 
is when the CEO is also the owner; while the three dummies take the value of one (1) if the 
CEO came from outside the firm, (2) if she was appointed from within the firm, and (3) if 
other. The CEO’s age is a categorical variable where the first category is under 25, the last 
(seventh) one is 75 or over, and the other categories cover 10 years each. Again, we create a 
set of dummies from this variable. The financial reward is also a dummy variable which takes 
the value 1 if the CEO has received financial reward for her performance. 
We find that there is a difference between owner and non-owner CEOs in their 
willingness to decentralize: non-owner CEOs are actually less likely to decentralize by 
between around 2 and 3 percentage points. However, we do not find evidence for a 
relationship between the age of the CEO and centralization. Based on the results, it seems 
that CEOs receiving financial incentives are more likely to change the decision-making 
process: the probability of both centralization and decentralization is about 4 percentage 
points higher in firms where managers have financial incentives. 
Strategy. Strategy influences structure (Mintzberg, 1990; Ansoff, 1991), and, as a 
result, centralization can also vary among companies with different strategies. Therefore, 
three strategic focus dummies were derived from the spontaneous answer to the question 
“With respect to your business, indicate the main competitive factors which will determine 
the success of your firm in the next years” (1) Lowering product cost; (2) Improving product 
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quality; and (3) Increasing brand recognition. The estimates suggest that firms with a low 
cost strategic focus were more likely to centralize than firms with ‘other’ focus. This is in line 
with the assumption that during recessions centralized organizations can cut costs more 
efficiently.  
Importantly, the estimates for our key variables do not change greatly. Controlling for 
management and strategy variables does not change our main conclusions.  
Table 6 
Multinomial logit – robustness check 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Decentralized Centralized Decentralized Centralized 
 
Coefficients Marginal effects 
Sales change 0.00417 -0.000987 0.0003 -0.000210 
 (0.00261) (0.00176) (0.000176) (0.000252) 
Employment change 0.00428 -0.00835 0.000423 -0.00128 
 (0.00306) (0.00195) (0.000205) (0.000279) 
Investment change -0.000265 -0.00087 -4.29e-06 -0.000122 
 (0.000685) (0.000457) (4.60e-05) (6.55e-05) 
Postpone innovation inv. -0.317 -0.346 -0.0161 -0.0454 
 (0.0866) (0.0590) (0.00581) (0.00843) 
Age of CEO: 25-34 ys -0.628 -0.187 -0.0655 -0.0103 
 (0.865) (0.853) (0.112) (0.143) 
Age of CEO: 35-44 ys -1.229 -0.406 -0.107 -0.0335 
 (0.850) (0.844) (0.111) (0.141) 
Age of CEO: 45-54 ys -1.181 -0.615 -0.101 -0.0655 
 (0.848) (0.843) (0.111) (0.141) 
Age of CEO: 55-64 ys -1.193 -0.603 -0.102 -0.0636 
 (0.848) (0.844) (0.111) (0.141) 
Age of CEO: 65-74 ys -0.953 -0.716 -0.0825 -0.0828 
 (0.854) (0.847) (0.111) (0.142) 
Age of: CEO >75 -1.091 -0.387 -0.0986 -0.0328 
 (0.896) (0.858) (0.113) (0.144) 
CEO: manager outside the 
firm -0.145 0.173 -0.0120 0.0284 
 (0.192) (0.129) (0.0113) (0.0201) 
CEO: manager within the firm -0.0475 0.0738 -0.00437 0.0116 
 (0.172) (0.121) (0.0111) (0.0179) 
CEO: other -0.336 0.127 -0.0219 0.0239 
 (0.342) (0.206) (0.0174) (0.0317) 
Performance based financial 0.608 0.332 0.0382 0.0387 
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reward (0.0881) (0.0647) (0.00667) (0.00967) 
Strategy: Lowering product 
cost -0.128 0.102 -0.0104 0.0169 
 (0.0926) (0.0625) (0.00623) (0.00897) 
Strategy: Improving product 
quality 
-0.0119 
(0.0861) 
-0.121 
(0.0579) 
0.00110 
(0.00579) 
-0.0174 
(0.00832) 
Strategy: Increasing brand 
recognition 
0.213 
(0.0984) 
-0.00266 
(0.0684) 
0.0145 
(0.00660) 
-0.00376 
(0.00979) 
Industry dummies 2-digit NACE 
2-digit 
NACE 
2-digit NACE 
2-digit 
NACE 
Observations 9,701 9,701 9,701 9,701 
Pseudo R-2 0.0701 0.0701 0.0701 0.0701 
Log-likelihood -6719 -6719 -6719 -6719 
Note: The table shows the results of the multinomial logit model estimating the impact 
on centralization decision. Column 1 and 2 display regression coefficients, column 3 and 
4 show marginal effects. Sales change is the modified continuous measure of decrease in 
turnover. Employment change is measured in percentage. Investment change is the 
modified continuous measure of change in investment. Postpone innovation investment 
is 1 when the firm did not postpone innovation investment and zero otherwise. The 
other explanatory variables are dummy variables and described in the text. Initial 
centralization, employment and country controls are included, but not reported. 2-digit 
NACE codes are included as industry controls if noted. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  
 
Next, in Table A.3 in the Appendix we run a multinomial probit model which is more 
flexible than the multinomial logit. This model yields very similar results in terms of marginal 
effects to the multinomial logit specification reported earlier. 
Finally, as we have already mentioned, the turnover change variable is created from 
dummies where firms only reported intervals of turnover change. However, this 
manipulation may lead to functional form misspecification. In Table A.1 we include a set of 
dummies representing these intervals to find very similar results to the previous ones.  
Functional form problems may also arise with respect to the investment change 
variable. First, the question is constructed in such a way that firms which did not cut their 
investment only report this fact rather than the magnitude of increase in their investment. 
Second, there is a possible truncation problem for firms which did cut their investment by 
100 percent. Hence, we include two dummies for firms not cutting their investment and 
cutting it by 100 percent in columns (3) and (4) of Table A.1. Again, our main results do not 
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change, but we find that firms decreasing their investments radically were less likely to 
change their organization than other firms. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study has used a unique and large dataset of more than 14,000 European manufacturing 
firms to study the relationship between the size of different shocks faced by the firm during 
the 2008-09 recession and whether the firms changed the degree of centralization of their 
strategic decision-making.  
We have studied four measures of shocks: change in turnover, employment, 
investment, and whether the firm postponed an innovation project. We have found the 
strongest association with employment and postponing innovation: a 10 percentage point 
larger employment shock was associated with a 1.4 percentage point larger probability of 
centralization, while postponing innovation increased the probability of centralization by 
nearly 6 percent. The other two shocks proved to be less important when controlling for these 
variables. The common characteristic in the two shocks with strong effects is that they are 
more likely to proxy the management’s expectations about the future and the time horizon of 
their decisions.  
We have also found evidence that centralization during recessions is associated with a 
number of other factors. First, there are considerable differences across countries suggesting 
evidence for the importance of culture. Second, family-owned firms were more likely to 
decentralize. Third, firms which were part of a group were more inclined to centralize than 
independent firms. Fourth, non-owner CEOs were more likely to decentralize than owner 
CEOs. Fifth, firms competing with their cost level were more likely to centralize than firms 
with other strategic focus.  
In terms of theory, the finding that larger shocks are associated with centralization may 
be in line with the threat-rigidity approach according to which managers centralize in a 
threatening environment. Centralization may also be optimal for more rapid search in a 
complex and rapidly changing solution landscape. 
Furthermore, our results also suggest that firms in general display a centralization cycle 
which follows the real economy: firms centralize during crises and decentralize during 
upturns. Nevertheless, our results also suggest that different countries and firms follow a 
heterogeneous cycle. A better understanding industry or country-level dynamics may require 
a higher degree appreciation of heterogeneity across firms. 
Several important theories suggest that the centralizing tendency during recessions 
may be suboptimal from the viewpoint of the firms. This implies that managers should 
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regularly any consciously review the decision-making process of the firm and analyze 
systematically the decisions taken at times when the firm is under stress.  
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APPENDIX tables 
Table A. 
Multinomial logit with discrete sales change 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Decentralized Centralized Decentralized Centralized 
 
Coefficients Marginal effects 
Sales decrease: 0-10% -0.00917 0.0555 -0.00156 0.00805 
 (0.0987) (0.0713) (0.00701) (0.0100) 
Sales decrease: 10-30% -0.213 0.139 -0.0161 0.0237 
 (0.0953) (0.0646) (0.00632) (0.00927) 
Sales decrease: >30% -0.258 0.0332 -0.0173 0.00851 
 (0.122) (0.0807) (0.00775) (0.0114) 
Employment change 0.00220 -0.00971 0.000288 -0.00145 
 (0.00262) (0.00166) (0.000168) (0.000238) 
Investment change -0.00297 -0.00202 -0.000163 -0.000252 
 (0.00216) (0.00146) (0.000138) (0.000209) 
Investment change 
(lower bound) 
-0.663 
(0.183) 
-0.442 
(0.118) 
-0.0365 
(0.0117) 
-0.0547 
(0.0169) 
Investment change 
(upper bound) 
0.121 
(0.259) 
0.0183 
(0.173) 
0.00761 
(0.0166) 
0.000863 
(0.0249) 
Postpone innovation 
investment 
-0.333 
(0.0749) 
-0.392 
(0.0496) 
-0.0162 
(0.00506) 
-0.0539 
(0.00754) 
Employment: 20-49 0.321 0.147 0.0168 0.0163 
 (0.0854) (0.0548) (0.00481) (0.00743) 
Employment: 50-249 0.694 0.434 0.0394 0.0534 
 (0.0984) (0.0665) (0.00673) (0.00985) 
Employment: > 250 0.612 0.724 0.0264 0.106 
 (0.146) (0.0932) (0.00989) (0.0160) 
France -0.544 -0.59 -0.0267 -0.0637 
 (0.231) (0.167) (0.0156) (0.0222) 
Germany -0.180 -0.346 -0.00813 -0.0413 
 (0.225) (0.165) (0.0157) (0.0223) 
Hungary -0.495 0.154 -0.0302 0.0288 
 (0.324) (0.202) (0.0186) (0.0293) 
Italy -0.295 0.756 -0.0287 0.136 
 (0.231) (0.161) (0.0156) (0.0232) 
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Spain 0.734 0.578 0.054 0.0765 
 (0.222) (0.162) (0.0166) (0.0231) 
UK -0.370 -0.168 -0.0210 -0.0182 
 (0.235) (0.168) (0.0159) (0.0229) 
Industry dummies 2-digit NACE 2-digit NACE 2-digit NACE 2-digit NACE 
Observations 13,727 13,727 13,727 13,727 
Pseudo R-2 0.0578 0.0578 0.0578 0.0578 
Log-likelihood -9471 -9471 -9471 -9471 
Note: The table shows the results of the multinomial logit models estimating the impact on 
centralization decision. The dependent variable is described in the text. Column 1 and 2 display 
regression coefficients, column 3 and 4 show marginal effects. Sales decrease is a dummy variable, 
where the baseline value is the increase of turnover. Investment change is the modified continuous 
measure of change in investment. The investment change lower/upper bound takes the value 1, when 
the company decreased its planned investment by 10Appendi0% or 0%. Postpone innovation 
investment is 1 when the firm did not postpone innovation investment and zero otherwise. 
Employment is measured with a set of dummies. In the case of countries the baseline is Austria. 2-
digit industry NACE codes are included when noted. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
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Table A.2  
Correlation between the different crisis measures 
 
Employment 
change 
Sales 
change 
Investment 
change 
Postpone 
innovation inv. 
Employment change 1 
   Sales change 0.4444 1 
  Investment change 0.2722 0.3201 1 
 Postpone innovation inv. 0.1646 0.2041 0.3516 1 
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Table A.3 
Multinomial probit model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Decentralized Centralized Decentralized Centralized Decentralized Centralized Decentralized Centralized 
 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients 
Marginal 
effects 
Sales change 0.00225 -0.00247 0.000301 -0.000542 0.00356 -0.000745 0.000383 -0.000249 
 
(0.00142) (0.00111) (0.000138) (0.000206) (0.00145) (0.00114) (0.000141) (0.000210) 
Employment 
change 
-0.000128 
(0.00168) 
-0.00845 
(0.00129) 
0.000239 
(0.000163) 
-0.00162 
(0.000238) 
0.000837 
(0.00170) 
-0.00724 
(0.00131) 
0.000302 
(0.000165) 
-0.00141 
(0.000239) 
Investment 
change     
-0.000428 
(0.000386) 
-0.000633 
(0.000304) 
-2.43e-05 
(3.75e-05) 
-0.000108 
(5.58e-05) 
Postpone 
innovation 
inv. 
    
-0.265 
(0.0494) 
-0.327 
(0.0391) 
-0.0174 
(0.00505) 
-0.056 
(0.00754) 
Employment: 
20-49 
0.224 
(0.0550) 
0.133 
(0.0426) 
0.0172 
(0.00479) 
0.0183 
(0.00742) 
0.222 
(0.0551) 
0.127 
(0.0427) 
0.017 
(0.00479) 
0.0173 
(0.00740) 
Employment: 
50-249 
0.505 
(0.0646) 
0.384 
(0.0517) 
0.0405 
(0.00670) 
0.059 
(0.00982) 
0.504 
(0.0648) 
0.38 
(0.0519) 
0.0404 
(0.00670) 
0.0578 
(0.00979) 
Employment:  
> 250 
0.492 
(0.0952) 
0.619 
(0.0737) 
0.0291 
(0.00994) 
0.113 
(0.0159) 
0.499 
(0.0955) 
0.621 
(0.0741) 
0.0296 
(0.00999) 
0.112 
(0.0159) 
France -0.412 -0.466 -0.0281 -0.0649 -0.419 -0.473 -0.0286 -0.0659 
 (0.152) (0.127) (0.0156) (0.0220) (0.152) (0.127) (0.0157) (0.0222) 
Germany -0.151 -0.27 -0.00880 -0.0419 -0.151 -0.27 -0.00878 -0.0419 
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 (0.150) (0.126) (0.0157) (0.0221) (0.150) (0.126) (0.0159) (0.0223) 
Hungary -0.290 0.109 -0.0298 0.0288 -0.300 0.102 -0.0307 0.0278 
 (0.206) (0.157) (0.0186) (0.0294) (0.206) (0.158) (0.0188) (0.0295) 
Italy -0.109 0.603 -0.0289 0.137 -0.118 0.6 -0.0299 0.137 
 (0.152) (0.124) (0.0156) (0.0231) (0.152) (0.124) (0.0157) (0.0232) 
Spain 0.584 0.53 0.0579 0.0884 0.538 0.475 0.0534 0.0774 
 (0.149) (0.125) (0.0166) (0.0230) (0.149) (0.125) (0.0167) (0.0231) 
UK -0.263 -0.151 -0.0218 -0.0202 -0.269 -0.159 -0.0223 -0.0212 
 (0.155) (0.129) (0.0159) (0.0227) (0.155) (0.129) (0.0160) (0.0229) 
Industry 
dummies 
2-digit NACE 
2-digit 
NACE 
2-digit NACE 
2-digit 
NACE 
2-digit NACE 
2-digit 
NACE 
2-digit NACE 
2-digit 
NACE 
Observations 13,727 13,727 13,727 13,727 13,727 13,727 13,727 13,727 
Log-
likelihood 
-9540 -9540 -9540 -9540 -9487 -9487 -9487 -9487 
Note: The table shows the results of the multinomial probit models estimating the impact on centralization decision. The 
dependent variable shows whether the firm centralized, decentralized or did not change their decision-making process during 
2009, with 'no change' as the base category. Columns 1 and 2 display regression coefficients, column 3 and 4 show marginal 
effects, while columns (4)-(8) repeat this exercise with a model where we also include the change in investment and a dummy 
showing if the firm postponed its innovation activities. Sales change is the modified continuous measure of decrease in 
turnover. Employment change is measured in percentage. Investment change is the modified continuous measure of change in 
investment. Postpone innovation investment is 1 when the firm did not postpone innovation investment and zero otherwise. 
Employment is measured with a set of dummies. In the case of countries the baseline is Austria. 2-digit industry NACE codes 
are included when noted. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
 
